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I. INTRODUCTION
The consumption of utilities (for example, energy and water), along with that of
other goods such as food, clothing, shelter, health and education, is often thought
of as something that has particular distributional significance. This concern is
reflected by the range of welfare and regulatory measures in place that are
designed to guard against non-participation or under-consumption. The pricing
of these goods illustrates well the conflicting arguments between economic
efficiency and equity. The case for charging VAT on fuel, for example, is
essentially an efficiency argument which points to the distortionary effects of a
tax system that increases the prices of some goods (for example, double-glazing)
and not of others (for example, domestic energy). The counter-argument is based
upon notions of equity: that it is unfair to tax a necessity because the effects fall
hardest on the living standards of poor households.
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Other matters of energy pricing policy, aside from those that, like VAT, are
to do with the price level, are likewise subject to the competing claims of
economic efficiency and equity. The structure of costs in the energy supply side
is such that the marginal cost of providing and maintaining a connection to a
premises, and providing customer services such as meter reading and billing, can
be high relative to the marginal cost of supplying a therm of gas or a kilowatt-
hour of electricity. A policy of moving the balance between standing charges and
unit charges applied to domestic customers in line with generators’ costs might
be defended as a move toward a more efficient tariff structure, but it would have
distributional consequences that, in the absence of some kind of redistributive
framework, could have a serious effect on the living standards of poorer
households that are, say, more difficult to supply. In the UK, governments have
traditionally cared about the way in which the cost of utilities affects those on
low incomes. Originally, the problem was seen as being one of pricing policy;
more recently, with the privatisation of the large public utilities, the emphasis
has shifted somewhat to income support measures.
In this paper, we discuss some of the influences that determine the relative
prices a utility company charges to different groups of consumers for the use of
its services. We argue that there are a number of influences, but regulators have
often taken advantage of their position to distort prices in order to favour
particular classes of customers. In doing so, they are often acting ultra vires,
since such actions invariably go beyond the social duties of the regulator laid
down in the relevant Act. Furthermore, we argue that in so far as regulators do
seek to address distributional issues in their price-setting formulas, such attempts
are inefficient compared with the use of the more direct tax and benefit system.
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we discuss some of the reasons why
regulators may distort prices. We then concentrate on the energy utilities and
look at some empirical evidence specifically on the effects of the price of gas
and electricity on different types of household. We show that energy pricing is a
matter of distributional concern both in terms of its level and in terms of its
structure. We then examine the various options available with which to tackle
these distributional concerns — the distortion of prices by the regulators, the use
of the tax and benefit system, and direct provision. Finally, we discuss the extent
to which the regulators have any mandate to manipulate prices in this way.
II. A REVIEW OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Regulated utility companies are bound by licences not to practise undue price
discrimination. Of course, there are problems in determining what is meant by
‘undue’. The competition case law in this area suggests that, in principle, pricesRegulation and Redistribution in Utilities
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must bear a ‘reasonable’ relationship to costs,
2 but the precedent also implies
that undue discrimination is a question of degree. Thus price discrimination
could exist in principle but its extent might be negligible and therefore not
‘undue’. The degree to which any particular instance of price discrimination will
be regarded as undue is, therefore, still rather vague, particularly when the notion
is applied in monopoly markets. Discriminatory behaviour is a matter addressed
under general competition law when it excludes, or is designed to exclude,
competition. In monopoly markets, characterising discrimination as ‘undue’
when it threatens the competitive process is meaningless, and other definitions
need to be established.
In major network industries such as the regulated industries, it is very
difficult to identify precisely the costs of serving even relatively large groups of
customers, because of the scope available for allocating joint and common costs
among customers. One might argue that a set of tariffs was discriminatory, and
even exhibited cross-subsidy, if the revenue from each product or customer
group did not fully recover its fully allocated costs. However, cross-subsidy
logically should exist only when the deletion of one service benefits the users of
other services, and therefore an economist would argue that cross-subsidy can
only occur when prices lie outside the ‘core’ defined as the set of prices that is
bounded from below by the incremental cost of production and from above by
the stand-alone cost of production (see Faulhaber (1975) for a proof of this
proposition). Whilst accepting that different prices within the core were
discriminatory, the economist would only be concerned about this to the extent
that relative price differences were designed to minimise the overall welfare loss
of departing from marginal cost prices.
The licence conditions under which the regulated companies operate tend to
suggest a policy in favour of cost-reflectiveness
3 based upon the fully allocated
cost approach. Regulators have certainly regarded greater cost-reflectiveness in
prices as desirable in principle. In law, the only obstacles to greater cost-
reflectiveness are the statutory obligations that the regulators must ensure that
the companies fulfil with respect to certain customer groups, mainly the elderly
and disabled. The gas care plan, which offers free and frequent appliance checks
to elderly and disabled users, is one example; British Telecom having to provide
free emergency services to all users is another. All these people and services are
being supplied at prices that imply a mark-up over costs that is not the same as
for other people or services. The cost of provision of these social obligations is
recouped from other services.
Aside from these duties, the regulators also have the power to instruct the
companies to abandon the heavily cross-subsidised monopoly markets that they
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inherited at privatisation. No great inroads have been made in the domestic
markets. In the energy and telecommunications industries, there have, of course,
been changes in the balance of prices between very large consumer groups, such
as between households and businesses in the energy market. The cross-subsidy
that flowed from businesses to households when the gas and electricity industries
were nationalised has ended as a result of introducing competition in the large-
user markets. However, within the markets over which the regulator has explicit
and formal control, the balance of prices has scarcely changed from the cross-
subsidised structure that existed when the firms were nationalised.
Consider an example from the gas industry. Between the franchise market
and the competitive market, tariffs are balanced in what appears to be a non-
discriminatory way.
4 However, within the franchise market, there exists a
uniform tariff irrespective of the consumer’s load or location. Since some
customers are more costly to serve than the average, there is obviously price
discrimination, and probably even cross-subsidy, in the sense that some prices
will lie outside the core.
One source of cross-subsidy is the current British Gas standing charge /
volume charge mix which is £36.88 per year and 43.8 pence per therm. In its
data supplied to the 1993 Monopolies and Mergers Commission investigation,
British Gas estimated its supply costs alone to be £51.74 for the average
customer of 650 therms. Not all of these costs are customer-related — a good
assumption seems to be that a quarter are commodity-related and the rest are
customer-related. This would imply a supply cost for each customer of £38.80.
More recently, British Gas has engaged in a massive costing exercise of the
transportation business (TransCo)
5 and has determined a fixed site cost per
customer of £26.08 (see British Gas (1994)). The total cost per customer could,
therefore, be of the order of about £65, with a volume charge of 39 pence per
therm. Quite clearly, the difference between these estimates of the fixed and
variable costs, and the fixed and variable charges, could imply a significant
cross-subsidy from large to small users. At present, British Gas has the statutory
right to rebalance its tariffs to a standing charge of £54 and a variable charge of
40.3 pence per therm, but it has declined to exercise this right, and OFGAS has
not urged it to do so.
The second source of cross-subsidy lies within the supply costs themselves.
According to evidence British Gas submitted to the 1994 Trade and Industry
Select Committee investigation on domestic market liberalisation, some
customers are more costly to serve than others. British Gas estimates that the
administration cost of sending the bill, receiving the money and any further
proceedings is about £10 per year for customers paying by direct debit and £100
per year for customers who go through all the procedures short of disconnection.
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The process of reflecting these costs began recently with the announcement that
charges for those on direct debit would be cut.
The third source of cross-subsidy is the uniform tariff irrespective of location,
which British Gas estimates to be 4 per cent either side of the average
transportation charge (i.e. an 8 per cent spread) and OFGAS estimates to be 2
per cent either side (see OFGAS (1994)).
These cross-subsidies have remained in place in the eight years since gas
privatisation, and the regulator has shown no enthusiasm for eliminating them
whilst the market remained a statutory monopoly. However, from 1996 onwards,
the cross-subsidies in the supply element of the business will begin to be eroded
as a result of liberalisation of the domestic market. Thus we can expect discounts
for prompt payers and customers who pay by direct debit to grow, whilst
penalties for late payment will increase. An interesting issue that we do not
address here is what will become of the current statutory obligations towards
elderly and disabled users in the competitive market.
However, even though liberalisation will erode cross-subsidies in the
domestic supply market, the regulator can still influence relative prices in the
market by exerting her power over the single remaining monopolist, TransCo.
This indeed is what she did in October 1994. As noted above, the British Gas
costing exercise concluded that the fixed element of the site cost was £26.08, and
also that the volume cost was 2.48 pence per therm. The fixed site cost derived
from this costing exercise is significantly lower than earlier estimates (around
£90 million was reclassified as a variable cost). OFGAS decreed that the fixed
site charge should be £15 and the volume charge should be 4.19 pence per therm,
and thereby perpetuated a large element of the cross-subsidy that flows from
large to small users in the domestic market.
We must now ask ourselves why regulators would want to distort prices. A
number of possibilities spring to mind: the first is that they are distorting prices
in order to promote competition; the second is that they are promoting a sense of
equity and fairness in the set of tariffs; the third is that they are captured by a
particular group of customers and are engaging in a policy of what Posner (1971)
called ‘taxation by regulation’, whereby cross-subsidisation between groups of
users, sanctioned by the regulator, represents a form of taxation with the
regulator acting as tax collector and redistributor. It is extremely difficult to
disentangle these explanations, and of course the latter two cases will often be
observationally equivalent, but except in certain specified cases, the regulator
has no mandate to promote a sense of equity and fairness in tariffs.
The notion that the promotion of competition may require manipulation of
prices is a persuasive one. In the telecommunications industry, for example, line
rentals and connection charges are set at below average cost (and probably below
marginal cost as well) and there is a low-user scheme in operation. Call charges,
especially trunk and international charges, are correspondingly higher. Mercury
Communications Ltd (MCL) is a major competitor to British Telecom,Fiscal Studies
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especially in the long-distance and international call markets. There are
arguments to suggest that prices and profits should be high in these markets to
promote competition, and, since British Telecom must earn only normal profits,
its prices and profits in other markets must be correspondingly lower. This is,
however, only a partial explanation of the tariff structure. The period of fastest
tariff rebalancing towards costs occurred up until 1989, but it has subsequently
slowed, and indeed the price cap regulations in place until 1997 imply yet slower
rebalancing towards cost. Yet, if anything, one would expect the opposite pattern
to apply — slow rebalancing at first to establish Mercury, followed by faster
rebalancing as it gains a market share. Furthermore, since 1991, cable operators
are permitted to enter the market to offer local telecommunications services.
They must compete, however, against British Telecom’s local call charges and
connection charges which are artificially low. Allowing British Telecom to
rebalance its charges more quickly would benefit these operators and promote
more entry into this market. Thus the theory that slow rebalancing exists to
promote competition does not explain the current set of charges; indeed,
rebalancing could have an ambiguous impact on competition, benefiting some
competitors but harming others.
The other explanation for the low-user scheme and the cross-subsidised
pricing structure is that OFTEL is practising a social policy of taxation by
regulation. Whether slow rebalancing is a noble public interest objective or
simply an indication of the political sensitivity of rebalancing is an interesting
question. In 1991, Sir Bryan Carsberg defended his decision not to permit faster
rebalancing, not on the grounds that competition for long-distance services might
be adversely affected, or even because he was promoting a sense of equity in
prices. He said:
At present, local prices are uneconomically low and long distance prices are too high.
Altering the balance of these prices would increase the encouragement given to competition
at the local level. However, such a change would also affect residential customers
detrimentally, and vociferous objections would be likely to ensue.
This admission would tend to imply that rebalancing has been slow in order to
appease 18 million households at the expense of a rather smaller number of
business customers.
Returning to the gas industry, OFGAS has denied that the standing charge /
variable charge mix implies a cross-subsidy because the standing charge is
higher than the avoidable customer cost — as such, the price falls within the cost
`core’. Assuming that its calculations are correct, all the overheads of the
business are now loaded on to the volume charge (the most price-elastic
component) which is not efficient unless one believes that the elasticity of
demand for participation is greater than the elasticity of demand for consumption
— an unlikely proposition. This has the effect of creating a difference of £63.10Regulation and Redistribution in Utilities
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between the customer cost price paid by a 44-therm user and the customer cost
price paid by a 1,550-therm user, to cover the costs of the meter, service pipe,
safety and emergency services, which one would intuitively expect to be the
same for all customers. One is left with the impression that in order to achieve
the desired price, OFGAS has distorted the definition of costs. Further, one
could note that the OFGAS / DTI joint consultation document, Competition and
Choice in the Gas Market, made the point that customers must pay the full cost
of the energy resources they consume, not the avoidable cost. So whether the
mix exhibits cross-subsidy or not, the relative price regime is not particularly
efficient, it violates government policy and the decision generates confusion with
respect to future relative price determinations — will they be based upon fully
allocated costs or avoidable costs? We can find two explanations for the
regulator’s decision to impose this set of relative prices. The first is that this is a
measure designed to promote equity in a liberalised domestic market. The
second is that it was a political act designed to smooth the introduction of
competition in the domestic gas market which will subsequently be reversed.
The problem is that we do not know which of these explanations is correct.
OFGAS has said that it selected a low standing charge to enhance prospects for
competition. However, the Trade and Industry Select Committee has put down a
marker on this issue and, in its final report (1994), called for an assurance from
the government and OFGAS that the cross-subsidy would not be removed. It
states that ‘... it would be unacceptable if, without this being made explicit,
cross-subsidies were put in place simply to facilitate the transition to a
competitive market, only to be removed subsequently’.
Some commentators
6 have argued that technically the cross-subsidisation
could remain in place indefinitely, and that competition could continue to
flourish. This may be feasible in electricity transmission, where the company
does not engage in any other activities, and so long as it charges the same prices
to all operators, it scarcely matters to the operators that the charges may be
inefficient. However, when a company owns the network and can also supply a
service over the network in competition with others, the situation is rather
different and the competitors must rely on the regulator to ensure that the
accounting separation between the network services and the potentially
competitive activities is working effectively. Recently, the electricity regulator
sounded out the possibility of structural separation of the electricity distribution
and supply businesses of the regional electricity companies. In gas, the cross-
subsidy in TransCo will limit the big price falls that would otherwise have been
due to large domestic users and will therefore make them reluctant to switch
suppliers — there will be fewer cherries to pick. After 1998, this may create a
pressure from independent suppliers on OFGAS to remove the cross- subsidies
in TransCo.
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Recently, the Secretary of State gave some kind of assurance that ‘there
would be no point in changing the regime shortly after it had been introduced’,
but he conceded that `the matter is subject in the end to the regulatory regime’
(Gas Bill Parliamentary Debates, Hansard, 13 March 1995).
It is clear from the examples in the gas and telecommunications industries
that there are a number of influences at work in determining relative prices, but
what is somewhat unclear is the relative strength of each. We can observe that
regulators have interfered in price structures and, in certain cases, it is pretty
clear that the rationale is to favour particular classes of customer — the low-user
scheme in telecommunications is an example, and there has been enough of a
hint from the first Director General of Telecommunications that the inefficient
pricing of access and calls has been in order to favour domestic customers.
However, a lack of transparency exists with respect to the latest OFGAS
determination on TransCo’s prices, but it is likely that they have been set to
minimise price variation (and the associated popular discontent) following
liberalisation.
It may, of course, be desirable to manipulate utility prices for social ends.
Although empirical evidence in telecommunications has put the welfare loss of
inefficient prices at about £200 million per year (Attenborough, Foster and
Sandbach, 1991), it is also the case that the impact on the distribution of income
as a result of efficient pricing can be very significant. For example, the Social
Policy Research Unit (1989) reports that gas consumption is strongly related to
income, and therefore significant changes in the price of gas (or indeed of any
other utility product) could have correspondingly significant implications for
equity between groups. It is to these distributional issues that we now turn.
III. ENERGY CHARGES AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION
IN THE DOMESTIC SECTOR
In this section, we use data from the 1993 Family Expenditure Survey (FES) to
illustrate the distributional significance of the consumption of energy. The FES
is an annual survey of around 7,000 randomly selected households. It provides
detailed information on household expenditures, incomes and demographics. We
look at the patterns of spending on energy and also examine the pattern of
spending allocated to fixed versus variable costs.
1. The Level of Charges
If the price of domestic energy matters, then it is because energy consumption is
a matter of necessity to rich and poor alike. The notion that the individual should
have access to a set of basic goods, sufficient to confer on that individual theRegulation and Redistribution in Utilities
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capability to achieve a minimum standard of living,
7 is widely accepted. Some
goods are more important than others in this respect, while some are absolute
requirements. These are generally considered absolute necessities, the need for
which does not increase with household income or total expenditure.
The earliest studies of household budgets were conducted by Engel, 100
years ago.
8 He showed that household expenditure on necessities was relatively
invariant to the level of total expenditure. That is, once basic needs are met,
expenditure on necessities does not increase as quickly as the household’s total
spending. The result is that the proportion of total spending allocated to
necessities falls as total household expenditure increases. This relationship,
when graphed for a particular good, is known as the Engel curve. Figure 1 shows
the Engel curve for domestic fuel, drawn using the 1993 FES.
9
Figure 1 shows that the amount spent on fuels, expressed as a percentage of
total household expenditure (the budget share), falls as (log) total expenditure
increases. This is characteristic of many goods that are usually thought of as
necessities, but is particularly clear for a good such as fuel in which quality
choice by the household does not affect the direction of the relationship between
FIGURE 1
The Engel Curve for Domestic Energy
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The Engel Curve for Domestic Energy, by Income Group
expenditure and consumption. Average energy spending as a proportion of total
expenditure has been constant at around 5 per cent since the FES was first
conducted in 1957.
Figure 2 shows Engel curves calculated using the same data, but drawn
separately for households in the bottom 10 per cent of the income distribution
and the top 90 per cent. Since total expenditure is closely (and positively)
correlated with household income, this shows that energy accounts for a larger
part of the budgets of low-income households than of those of higher-income
households, even conditional on an identical level of total expenditure.
Another important household characteristic that affects the Engel curve for
fuel is age; even given the same income level, we would expect older households
to have higher energy consumption than households of working age because they
spend more time at home. Figure 3 shows the Engel curve for fuel, once again
using the same data, but now with the sample split into pensioner and non-
pensioner households. Pensioners tend to have higher fuel budget shares than
other households.
Age and income are, of course, correlated. Very young and very old
households tend to be poorer because they have just started work or they are no
longer working. In Figure 4, we split our sample simultaneously by age and
income to analyse the joint distribution of income, age and the budget share of
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FIGURE 3
The Engel Curve for Domestic Energy: Pensioners and Non-Pensioners
households. They are highest for the oldest and poorest households, and lowest
for the richest and youngest. The relationship between age and fuel budget
shares, though, is not simply in one direction. Particularly among households in
the bottom two income bands, fuel shares are lowest in the second and third age
bands, not the first.
The shape of the Engel curve, and the way in which different households are
located along it, have immediate implications for the way in which changes in
energy costs will affect different households. If energy consumption were not a
necessity and fuel expenditure increased in proportion to total expenditure, the
Engel curve would be flat, and consequently changes in energy costs would
affect the cost of living of all households equally. However, Figures 1 to 4 show
that any given increase in the relative cost of energy will have a bigger effect on
the cost of living of poorer and older households than it will on that of the
younger and the better off. For example, in 1993, the average fuel budget share
was 4.8 per cent. The average share for households in the bottom 20 per cent of
the income distribution was 10.7 per cent. For households in the lowest income
quintile in which the head of household was retired, it was 12.2 per cent. An
increase in the relative cost of energy would increase the cost of living for the
poor and the old by more than twice the average.
These effects are also compounded by other factors that affect energy
consumption. These include the energy efficiency of the household’s home. The




































Fuel Budget  Shares, by Age and Income
FIGURE 5
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measures by households. However, work by Brechling and Smith (1994), which
uses the English House Conditions Survey, shows that energy efficiency is
lowest in the public rented sector and highest in owner-occupied housing. Figure
5 shows the average fuel shares by tenure type, once more using the 1993 FES.
Fuel budget shares are highest for households in local authority or Housing
Association properties and lowest amongst households that are buying their
homes. Tenure is obviously correlated with income and age. The high fuel share
amongst households that own their homes outright may be largely to do with the
fact that most of these households are elderly and therefore less likely to be
working. It is, therefore, important not to ascribe these differences solely to
differences in the fuel efficiency of accommodation associated with different
tenures. However, Blundell, Pashardes and Weber (1993) and Baker and
Blundell (1991) show that differences in tenure, given income and age, still
account for significant variation in fuel budget shares.
2. The Tariff Structure
So far, we have concentrated on the way in which the pattern of domestic energy
demand has implications for the distributional effects of changes in the average
level of charges. Changes in tariff structure will also have distinct distributional
effects.
Since 1987, standing charges have increased at a faster rate than unit charges.
Standing charges to domestic electricity consumers have increased by 47 per
cent and unit charges by 40 per cent. Standing charges for domestic gas
consumers have increased by 29 per cent and unit charges by around 20 per cent.
Retail price inflation over the period was 38 per cent. Figures 6 and 7 show the
joint distribution of age, income and the standing charge as a percentage of
household electricity and gas expenditures respectively, using the 1993 FES.
On average, standing charges account for nearly 40 per cent of spending on
electricity by older and poorer households, and just over 25 per cent of gas
spending by them. The lowest percentages are among the richest members of the
middle age band, which is also the richest age-group. The lower percentages for
gas reflect the propensity for gas customers to become gas customers because
they consume more energy than average. The relative shift in the tariff structure
over the last few years has therefore had a more pronounced effect on the living
standards of the poorest and oldest households. These types of households are
also among those least likely to be gas users
10 and so are less likely to have
benefited from the slower increase in gas charges.
Flat-rate charges may be an efficient way of recovering the significant fixed
costs of energy production and, as we noted in Section II, there is clear evidence
for gas that the balance still has some way to go before the standing charge
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FIGURE 6
Standing Charges as a Percentage of Average Electricity Spending,
by Age and Income
reaches its ‘optimal’ level. But a shift in the balance of energy charging from
unit charges to standing charges would have distributional consequences that
would in general penalise the less well off. Since energy consumption is
manifestly something about which we have distributional concerns, we need to
think how best to achieve any distributional aims we might have.
IV. COMPENSATION
The distributional objectives set in this country and elsewhere include provision
for a minimum level of consumption of goods such as food, clothing, shelter,
health care, education and energy. In some of these cases, the means of provision
is the free availability of the good, as in the case of health care or education in
the UK; in others, such as food in the US, some provision comes in the form of
vouchers; and in yet others, such as food, clothing and most energy needs in the
UK, the provision is expected to be met from the general social security benefit
system. A final alternative is direct subsidy through distorting prices, either in a
state-owned activity or through mandatory regulation of private enterprise, as has
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FIGURE 7
Standing Charges as a Percentage of Average Gas Spending,
By Age and Income
As already noted, the bulk of the consumption of energy for low-income
households in this country is expected to be covered by the general provision of
social security benefits such as income support, family credit and retirement
pensions. In addition, special cold weather payments are available to certain
benefit recipients during abnormally cold weather.
11 But there is also evidence
that the balance of charges between standing charges and charges per unit of
consumption has in the past been set so as to assist small consumers, rather than
at a level that was more likely to achieve purely economic efficiency. Recent
years have seen a shift in this, towards higher standing charges, which has the
distributional consequences described earlier. It seems reasonable to expect this
to continue. If we wish to respond in some way, there are three obvious routes:
regulate providers to ensure that the shift in pricing goes no further or is
reversed; increase general social security benefits; or provide energy directly for
some groups. We consider each of these below.
It is worth noting that it is not only in explicit pricing policy that
distributional objectives can play a part. In the case of utilities such as
telecommunications or energy, charges for connection can also be an issue.
                                                                                                                                   























Enforcing `free’ connection, or connection for the same charge regardless of
cost, will cross-subsidise from those who are easily connected to those in
outlying areas, and encourages new entrants to locate in regions or parts of
regions with few difficult-to-connect customers. Making connection available to
all is a redistributive aim, not part of a policy to enhance efficiency.
1. Regulation to Achieve Distributional Goals
The natural response to distributional concerns springing from altered pricing
policies by a private sector monopoly or quasi-monopoly is simply not to allow
such changes or to insist that they are not applied to vulnerable groups. But we
would argue that such a response confuses the achievement of economic
efficiency with the achievement of distributional objectives.
That efficiency and equity are frequently inconsistent is a commonplace of
economic analysis, but often too little thought is given to the appropriate way of
achieving `equity’. We have a social security system and a tax system so as to
achieve distributional ends, and we should be very wary of any suggestion that
we use other mechanisms to achieve those ends, since they will in general be less
suited to the task. The temptation to use a single tool to achieve many aims is
common, but should be resisted. The principal aim of a regulatory mechanism
applied to a private sector monopoly is to improve the efficiency of the outcome
for price and output. If the distributional consequences of such an outcome are of
concern, the sensible thing to do is to tackle those distributional problems openly
and directly through the tax and transfer system.
Any attempt to redistribute through regulation will typically be just as costly
in economic terms as redistribution by taxes and benefits, and almost certainly
more costly, and will be less clear. If the same help to those on low incomes or in
distant regions is to be achieved, either (i) profits must be lower, redistributing
from shareholders and making investment in the industry less attractive, or (ii) if
the companies are not profit maximising ex ante and they seek to maintain
their previous profits, prices for others must be higher, redistributing from other
consumers and driving a wedge between the cost of production and the price of
consumption. The same amount of redistribution is occurring as if run by direct
transfer payments, but the losers are determined by the producer and the
regulator, rather than by government. And by distorting both investment and
consumption and production decisions, the economy suffers. While it is true that
there would also be a distorting effect from any general taxes imposed to pay for
direct help, this should be smaller, since the taxes would be imposed deliberately
and after due consideration. It is also worth noting that regulators will typically
have less, and less useful, information than direct tax or social security
administrators if the aim is to target those on low incomes. While low levels of
consumption may be correlated with need, the correlation will not be perfect:
some low users will have high incomes, and vice versa.Regulation and Redistribution in Utilities
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A second problem encountered in using regulation to achieve social
objectives concerns accountability. If regulators are to manipulate prices to
favour certain classes of customers, then their actions must have legitimacy. The
framework of regulation that was established with the privatisation of British
Telecom did not consider regulation from a social perspective. This is not
surprising. Foster (1992) provides an absorbing account of the regulation of
utilities over the last century or more, which illustrates, among other things, how
continued intervention into the running of enterprises in the name of the ‘public
good’ eventually compromised the efficiency of the enterprises. In addition, the
political mood at the time of the major privatisations saw the industries as wealth
creators, not instruments of social policy. Thus the social provisions put upon the
privatised utilities were pretty minimal. Common to all the Acts that privatised
the companies are obligations to supply all reasonable demands — the universal
service obligation — and there are also some ad hoc requirements placed upon
the companies. To begin with, the regulators themselves saw their role as being
simply economic. In his first annual report (OFTEL, 1985), the Director General
of Telecommunications (DGT) clearly sets out his role:
I should make it clear that I do not think that it would be appropriate for me to seek to
impose a balance of prices in a way that was motivated primarily by a desire to achieve
some particular redistribution of income amongst members of the community, nor do I
think my powers would permit me to do this.... I do not believe, for example, that I could
properly put forward a proposal for a rule that all people on low incomes should be given
telephones free of rentals; such a proposal would involve arbitrary judgements about
matters of income redistribution and my making it would involve the usurping of the
proper role of government.
Of course, in practice, all the regulators, including the DGT, have taken into
account the social impact of relative price movements, a point recently
acknowledged by the electricity regulator, Stephen Littlechild, who said at a
recent conference that regulators do have a social concern, which influences
regulatory policy.
12
There is a set of criteria a regulatory agency of any sort must fulfil if it is to
be ‘legitimate’, and it is summarised by Baldwin and McCrudden (1987). The
regulator should have a legislative mandate, be accountable, follow due process,
have expertise and be efficient, both in the running of the office and in making
decisions that lead to efficient outcomes.
Regulators have very little legitimacy in manipulating tariffs for social ends
— there is certainly no explicit mandate for redistributive regulatory policy
except in a couple of well-defined cases (such as protection of the elderly and
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disabled). Where any authority may exist legitimately, it is where such activity
can be justified under the discretion allowed for the regulator in interpreting his
duties. Regulators are able to promote relative price regimes that are unduly
discriminatory in an economic sense because, as we argued above, there is no
fully worked-out legal notion of what ‘undue discrimination’ means in a
monopoly market. The definition of the universal service obligation is left
deliberately vague and regulators are able to make their own interpretations. In
telecommunications, the universal service provision could permit the company to
offer cheap tariffs to low-income users, but it is less clear that this duty would
justify the rest of the tariff structure. In gas, the provision is qualified by ‘so far
as it is economical’ to provide universal service and so provides a rather weaker
case for active intervention. In water, the case for intervention is also rather
weak, given that the primary duty is simply to secure that functions are properly
carried out in every area in England and Wales, though there is a duty to protect
the interests of every customer which could be interpreted to justify social
intervention. Electricity contains a very general duty to secure that all reasonable
demands for electricity are satisfied. An objective reading of the law would
appear to limit the use of cross-subsidy to achieve these goals. Whilst the
regulator is still accountable to the Secretaries of State, those ministers are not
responsible for ensuring compliance with a non-existent mandate, and the
regulators are still less accountable to those who bear the ‘taxes’. The regulators
themselves have not consulted widely on the redistributive aspects of their
policies, and little information is in the public domain to assess the extent of the
redistribution (OFWAT excepted). Whilst the regulators may be expert in
economic regulation of companies, it is unlikely they are expert in taxation
theory and practice; and by pursuing a social agenda, the regulators can be
criticised for not making economically efficient decisions.
What may be required to offer the regulators legitimacy is a duty to have
regard to the equity implications of tariff rebalancing in monopoly enterprises, or
else pass the most contentious issues back to the elected government. The
deliberate use of regulation to achieve distributional goals is likely to be costly
to the economy, and risks being ineffective as producers strive to avoid its
intentions. Furthermore, at present, regulators generally have little or no mandate
to act in these matters. There are more direct ways of achieving these goals
which should be more effective and less distortionary and have the added merit
of being transparent.
2. Social Security Benefits
As we have argued above, the natural response to distributional concerns is to
use the social security and tax system to provide low-income households with
enough money to consume adequate amounts of goods such as energy. That isRegulation and Redistribution in Utilities
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the route we take for commodities such as food, clothing and transport, but there
are some special characteristics of energy consumption that add complications.
First, while providing money will be the optimal route where consumers are
fully informed and fully rational, it will not necessarily be where they are not. In
the case of energy, lack of information or understanding about the price of
energy or the appropriate level of consumption can certainly lead to market
failure, of which deaths from hypothermia are the clearest and most awful
example. Since the group for whom energy costs are highest as a share of their
spending is the poor and old, concerns about information failure are very real.
A second potential problem relates to uprating. In general in this country,
social security benefits are uprated in line with the general retail price index. To
the extent that the consumption patterns of those on low income are
systematically different from the population mean as represented in the RPI, the
uprating may be inappropriate, as would have been the case when VAT was
imposed on domestic energy — special compensation to account for this was
paid.
13 The best way to get around this problem may be to develop cost-of-living
indices for particular social groups whose consumption patterns may differ
significantly from the average.
The third problem with using general social security benefits is that since
energy is consumed not for its own sake but for heating, cooking and lighting,
the amount of energy needed will vary with the quality of the available
equipment and the house to be heated. Both equipment and house quality are
highly variable, so the standard social security problem exists of either paying
higher-than-necessary benefits to many to protect a few or paying inadequate
benefits to those with specially high needs. There is also an incentive problem to
do with paying households cash to improve the quality of their household
equipment. Direct provision may be a way of partially getting around this.
3. Direct Provision
One response to the problem of information failure is to propose direct
provision, either through vouchers or by setting standing charges to zero, or
perhaps through the use of low-user schemes. For the reasons discussed earlier,
any such schemes should be funded directly by government rather than by
providers. And the problem of identifying those who are truly needy remains; not
all elderly people are poor; nor are all low users deserving of help: some may
simply have very fuel-efficient homes or low demands for energy. However,
direct provision has an advantage over cash transfers. Blackorby and Donaldson
(1988) point out the problem of households having an increased incentive to
present themselves as in need of help with energy costs when they are not, in
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order to receive cash transfers, whereas if transfers were in kind, this incentive
would not exist.
A second kind of direct provision relates to the type of connection charge
discussed above. If a decision is taken that all should have access at the same
price to a service or that at least some help should be given to the isolated, the
most efficient way of achieving this is for government to pay directly to the
provider any amount over the cost for connection in a standard case. Such a
policy requires schedules of cost per mile of gas pipe or electricity cable or
optical fibre, but it should be possible to construct such schedules.
V. CONCLUSION
Energy consumption is quite appropriately something over which we have
distributional concerns. We have shown that it forms a large share of the budgets
of the poor, and that both the level of charges and the precise nature of the
charging structure can have significant distributional effects. Whether equity
considerations can explicitly be cited within the existing legislative structure, or
whether amendments would have to be made, the case remains that greater
transparency of relative price regulation is required. It is of great importance that
consumers, the incumbent firms and the new entrants get some indication from
the regulator of whether the cross-subsidies that currently exist are measures to
promote equity — in which case, they can be regarded as a permanent feature of
the landscape — or are simply in place to smooth the introduction of competition
or to promote certain competitors. If explicit social objectives were to be
incorporated into the framework of regulation, then transparency would be
improved and it could be made clear where the compromise between allocative
efficiency and equity is made. We have argued, however, that the distributional
significance of energy requires not that regulators and regulated industry should
carry redistributive duties, but that we should be clear about redistributive aims
and achieve them through direct government tax and transfer activity. Direct
action is measurable, visible, accountable and effective. Attempting to regulate
to achieve the same goals will be less effective, less accountable, less visible,
less measurable and more costly.
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